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Labor Relations and Labor Law in Japan＊ 
 
Atsushi Tsuneki and Manabu Matsunaka 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 The Japanese economy has provided economists with many puzzles.  It 
possesses various apparently unique properties such as the main bank system, mutual 
share holdings among group companies in the capital market, vertical relationship 
among firms (keiretsu) 1, and various interventions of the bureaucracy in the market 
                                                  
＊ The earlier version of the present article was first written when one of the present authors (Tsuneki)  
was visiting the Institute of Law and Economics at the University of Hamburg during 1999-2000; it was 
published in German as Atsushi Tsuneki, Arbeitsbeziehungen, Arbeitsrecht und Arbeitslosigkeit in Japan, 
in ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE DES ARBEITSRECHTS : BEITRÄGE ZUM VII. TRAVEMÜNDER SYMPOSIUM ZUR 
ÖKONOMISCHEN ANALYSE DES RECHTS (22.-25. MÄRZ 2000) 279 (Claus Ott & Hans-Bernd Schäfer eds., 
2001). We would like to thank the Institute for their hospitality and, in particular, Professor Hans-Bernd 
Schäfer for his kind consideration and various fruitful discussions on our research on law and economics. 
In this article, we have completely revised the older version and extended it taking into account the 
drastic change in the Japanese economy and legal environment after the 1990s. We would like to thank 
Professors Tomotaka Fujita, Yuji Genda, Hideshi Itoh, and particularly Fumio Ohtake for their comments 
and suggestions on some earlier versions of the present article. All remaining errors are ours. 
1 The nature and functions of the Japanese main bank system were surveyed by Masahiko Aoki, Hugh 
Patrick & Paul Sheard, The Japanese Main Bank System: An Introductory Overview, in THE JAPANESE 
MAIN BANK SYSTEM 3 (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds. 1994). For a summary of characteristics of 
Japanese enterprises including keiretsu and so-called Japanese employment system, see D. Eleanor 
Westney, Japanese Enterprise Faces the Twenty-First Century, in THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FIRM: 
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economy.2  A conspicuous example is the so-called Japanese employment custom, which 
is usually characterized by permanent employment and seniority.3  
 Although standard neo-classical economics regarded it as a source of 
inefficiency, which goes against the competition in the labor market and leads to 
considerable waste in terms of human resource allocation, so that it is reformed in order 
to increase the competitiveness of the labor market4, this argument is unable to  
explain why post-war Japan succeeded economically at least until the 1980s, while 
protecting the apparently inefficient customs.  
 It was not until recently that many economists have begun to argue that a 
series of properties shown by the Japanese economy should be understood as a rational 
                                                                                                                                                  
CHANGING ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 105, 106-35 (Paul DiMaggio ed. 
2001).  
2 Basic observations on the Japanese industrial policy were surveyed by e.g., TAKATOSHI ITOH, THE 
JAPANESE ECONOMY 196-205 (1992). Recently, there are discussions that cast doubt on the efficacy and 
even presence of systems which are said to be peculiar to Japan including main bank and bureaucracy led 
industrial policy. See, e.g., Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Fable of Keiretsu, 11 J. ECON. & 
MGMT. STRATEGY 169 (2002) (arguing that keiretsu has no substance and hence cannot be a characteristic 
of Japanese ecnomy); Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Does Relationship Banking Matter?: The 
Myth of the Japanese Main Bank, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 261, 272-99 (2005) (arguing that none of 
the features of so called main bank system is empirically supported). 
3 See, e.g., Kenichi Imai & Ryutaro Komiya, Characteristics of Japanese Firms, in BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN: VIEWS OF LEADING JAPANESE ECONOMISTS 19, 23 (Kenichi Imai & Ryutaro 
Komiya eds. 1994). 
4 See, e.g., GEORGE J. BORJAS, LABOR ECONOMICS 163 (2d ed. 2000). 
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and efficient system that supported the economic success of post-war Japan. 5 In the 
area of labor relations, Koike has argued that the apparently group-oriented nature of 
Japanese labor relations and organizations can be naturally understood as a superior 
economic system to adjust to an uncertain and changing economic environment.6  Some 
game-theoretic contributions argued that the labor relations in both the United States 
and Japan can be characterized as two possibly efficient equilibrium of the same game 
played by similarly rational players facing different institutional environments.7 
  Building on this rationalistic understanding of the Japanese employment 
customs, this article discusses the relationship between Japanese labor law and 
employment customs. It addresses the question of whether the Japanese labor law 
enforced the establishment of the Japanese employment customs, or whether it 
adjusted itself to the already established system in the process of post-war economic 
development in Japan.  We simultaneously consider whether or not the Japanese labor 
                                                  
5 See, e.g., Masahiko Aoki, Toward An Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
1 (1990) (survey of the economic analysis of the Japanese firm); RYUTARO KOMIYA, MASAHIRO OKUNO 
& KOTARO SUZUMURA, THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY OF JAPAN (1988) (economic analysis of Japanese 
industrial policy). 
6 See KAZUO KOIKE, THE ECONOMICS OF WORK IN JAPAN 63-68 (1996). 
7 See Masahiro Okuno, Monitoring Cost, Agency Relationship and Equilibrium Modes of Labor Contract, 
1 J. JAPANESE & INT’L ECON. 147 (1987); Yoshitsugu Kanemoto & W. Bentley MacLeod, The Theory of 
Contracts and Labor Practices in Japan and the United States, 12 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 159 
(1991). See also MASAHIKO AOKI, INFORMATION, INCENTIVES AND BARGAINING IN THE JAPANESE 
ECONOMY ch.3 (1988) (economic analysis of the Japanese Firm). 
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law enhanced the efficiency of the system, both in the economic growth process until the 
1980s and the stagnation period that began in the 1990s and has continued until now.  
Our basic conclusion is as follows.  The Japanese employment custom developed 
naturally through an agreement among the members of Japanese employment society 
and attained efficient economic performance up till the 1990s. During the time, the 
Japanese labor law mainly worked toward setting the stage for private bargaining and 
respected its agreement instead of enforcing the desirable result directly through legal 
regulations.  Through this indirect approach toward labor relations in Japan, at least 
part of the Japanese labor law made a highly positive contribution to the attainment of 
economic efficiency innate in Japanese labor relations.   
After the 1990s, when the long-run stagnation occurred in Japanese economy, the 
merit of the Japanese employment custom diminished and needed reform.  At this 
stage, the Japanese labor law began to adopt a more market-friendly approach in order 
to cope with this change in some aspects. However, in some other important aspects, it 
has taken the stance of directly regulating the economy, particularly in the area of 
employment protection and working hours regulation.  This was exactly opposite to the 
deregulation that had been necessary to recover the efficiency of the Japanese economy 
after the 1990s.  Due to this mismatched regulatory approach toward Japanese 
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employment relations, the Japanese labor law has become one important factor that 
hindered the performance of the Japanese economy.  If this tendency continues, the 
Japanese labor law will continue to levy huge social costs on the Japanese economic 
performance. 
The remaining part of the article is organized as follows.  In Part II, the article 
first clarifies the contents of the Japanese employment customs, referring to the major 
empirical researches on them, and presents the theoretical arguments that support the 
economic rationality of the customs.  We also discuss why the Japanese employment 
customs considerably lost their efficiency after the 1990s. 
In Part III, the article describes the historical outline of the Japanese labor law, 
its basic principles, and the various aspects of the Japanese labor law in general. In 
Part IV, the article analyses the economic effects of the Japanese labor law. Part IV. A. 
justifies our argument that the Japanese labor law made highly positive contributions 
to the establishment of efficient Japanese labor relations. Section IV.B. discusses the 
rational adjustment of the Japanese labor law to the structural change of the 
Japanese economy after the 1990s. Section IV.C. points out the recent development of 
regulations in the Japanese labor law. We examine working conditions and the 
promotion system, second, employment guarantee, and third, labor market policy, and 
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argue that some of them has become an important factor that expand the efficiency 
loss of the Japanese economy.  Part V summarizes the overall discussions and 
provides some remarks on the future of Japanese labor relations and labor law. 
  
II. Japanese Employment Custom: Fact and Theory 
A. Fact Findings 
It is now well known that “Japanese employment custom” (JEC hereafter) 
can be observed at least for some part in the U.S. and Europe, particularly for certain 
large, established companies.8  Therefore, it is not easy to precisely define the actual 
characteristics of the Japanese custom of employment.  
However, with many careful empirical researches, several distinctive 
findings concerning the Japanese employment custom have been reported for  
companies in Japan. First, the long-term employment relationship (LTER hereafter) 
applies more to Japan than other developed countries.  It is known that the tendency 
for long-term employment exists in some European countries such as Germany or 
France, and even in the large U.S. companies.9 However, the conclusive evidence by 
                                                  
8 See, e.g., KOIKE, supra note 6, at 40-41 (indicating that lifetime employment can be observed in the 
United States and in Western Europe); Westney, supra note 1, at 109 (discussing similarity and difference 
between Japan and other developed countries on employment system including lifetime employment). 
9 See supra note 8 and sources cited therein. 
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empirical research shows that on average, Japanese workers stay in the same firm for 
longer periods than American workers, and that the turnover rate of the former is 
lower.10  These facts have been confirmed by other empirical researches concerning 
Japanese and European workers.11 
 Second, both white- and at least some of blue-collar workers are embraced 
within the same system of long-term employment and career formation based on 
seniority and merit ratings.12  They experience a wider range of mutually related jobs 
than workers in other countries.  At the same time, job demarcation is more ambiguous.  
The delegation of de facto authority descends to the lower tiers of the production 
hierarchy, so that workers have a chance to utilize their first-hand knowledge in an 
attempt to improve the production system of their workplace.13  On-the-job training is 
actively provided by the older skilled workers to the younger unskilled workers.14 
                                                  
10 See Masanori Hashimoto & John Raisian, Employment Tenure and Earnings Profiles in Japan and the 
U.S., 75 AM. ECON. REV. 721, 721-58 (1985). 
11 See, e.g., D.H. WHITTAKER, MANAGING INNOVATION: A STUDY OF BRITISH AND JAPANESE FACTORIES 
(1990) (providing a comparison between Japan and the U.K.).  
12 See KOIKE, supra note 6, at 34-41. 
13 See J.R. Lincoln, M. Hanada & K. McBride, Organization Structures in Japanese and US 
Manufacturing, 31 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 338 (1986). See also James R. Lincoln & Kerry McBride, Japanese 
Industrial Organization in Comparative Perspective, 13 ANNUAL REV. SOCIOLOGY 289 (1987) (showing 
quantitative evidences that support facts stated in the text).  
14 Therefore, labor contracts for regular (typical) workers in Japan do not include explicit agreements on 
the job contents.  In contrast, labor contracts in the U.S. firms explicitly specify the kind of job and its 
performance standards. The authority is held by the management and engineers who derive the job 
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 Third, the wage payment system is also common to blue- and white-collar 
workers.15  Wage is determined by seniority and promotion to the higher ranking 
hierarchy, which depends on merit assessments but the wage level is only remotely 
related to the types of jobs.16  Most empirical researches show that merit assessments 
are more important than seniority in this process, and the lifetime earning differences 
among workers are rather large despite the appearance of egalitarianism.17  
In contrast, American workers are normally assigned jobs, with a wage directly 
attached to the job, which does not necessarily take into account other characteristics 
such as skill or education levels.18 A significant amount of wage increase in the U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                  
organization tightly, and workers must simply follow their orders in the process of production. See PETER 
B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS 42-56 
(1971) (explaining basic facts of the U.S. industry). For the basic facts in Japan, see KOIKE, supra note 6, 
at 50-61 & 66-72. 
15 See KOIKE, supra note 6, at 26. 
16 See Hashimoto & Raisian, supra note 10, at 728-32; A. L. Kalleberg & James R. Lincoln, The 
Structure of Earnings Inequality in the United States and Japan, 94 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY S121, S140-S145 
(1988). 
17 See Toshiaki Tachibanaki, The Determination of the Promotion Process in Organizations and of 
Earnings Differentials, 8 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 603 (1987); Toshiaki Tachibanaki, Education, 
Occupation, Hierarchy and Learnings 7 ECON. EDUC. REV.221 (1988) (empirical researches showing that 
promotion and associated increase of earnings differentials are more critically dependent on evaluation 
rather than seniority) ; Hiroyuki Fujimura, Seiseki Satei no Kokusai Hikaku [International Comparison of 
Merit Ratings], 362 NIHON RODO KYOKAI ZASSHI 26 (showing that wage increase is rather inelastic to 
seniority).  
18 See sources cited in supra note 16. 
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occurs when workers move up the job ladder. 19   Moreover, Koike observed that 
although the features explained above in relation to Japanese firms broadly applies to 
white-collar workers in large companies in the U.S. and Europe, they are characteristic 
of Japan in that this system is extended to blue-collar workers.20 
 Fourth, labor unions are not industry-based unions as in the Western countries, 
but company-based ones.21 The labor union has a long-term relationship with the 
employer and represents all workers of an enterprise, including both white- and 
blue-collar workers.22 The management of the firm is chiefly determined by inner 
promotion, and those selected for the management usually have some experience in 
labor union activities.23 Therefore, management and labor are more likely to have 
common interests, and the labor union indirectly has the power to influence the 
                                                  
19 See KOIKE, supra note 6, at 54-61; DOERINGER & PIORE, supra note 14, at 65-71. The facts pertaining 
to the U.S. are also broadly applicable to major European countries. See also MITSUO ISHIDA, CHINGIN NO 
SHAKAIKAGAKU: NIPPON TO IGIRISU (1990) [Social Science of Wages: Japan and Britain] (pointing out 
this difference chiefly in comparison with Japan and the UK.). 
20 See KOIKE, supra note 6, at 13-27. 
21 See ITOH, supra note 2, at 226 (1992); TAKASHII ARAKI, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN JAPAN 
164-65 (2002). 
22 See KOIKE, supra note 6, at 212-16. 
23 See e.g., Hiroyuki Fujimura, Keieisha no Kyaria to Hōshū no Jittai [The State of the Career and 
Payment of Managers], in GENDAI NIHON NO KŌPORETO GABANANSU [Corporate Governance in Modern 
Japan] 135 (Takeshi Inagami & Rengō Sogō Seikatsu Kaihatsu Kenkyusho eds. 2000). 
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management decisions through discussions between labor and management.24 
 Fifth, there are many non-regular workers (atypical workers) such as part-time 
workers and dispatched workers that are differentiated from regular workers in 
promotion, payment, and employment guarantee. 25  Therefore, the Japanese labor 
market has a dual nature, wherein the part of the market that consists of regular 
workers is internalized within the firm, while non-regular workers participate in an 
outside spot market and engage in more frequent career turnovers. Note that this dual 
nature is universally observed in the developed capitalist countries.26 However, it is 
characteristic of the Japanese economy to clearly distinguish regular and non-regular 
workers at the time of recruitment.27 
 These five properties apparently depict the group-oriented nature of the JEC, 
in view of the respect for the protection of employment and seniority, cooperative 
behavior among workers at the shop-floor, close connection between labor and 
                                                  
24 See KOIKE, supra note 6, at 195-216 (indicating the detailed international comparison of the functions 
of the labor union and its performance evaluation). 
25 Recently the percentages of these atypical workers are increasing particulary in service sector. See, e.g., 
Ryuichi Yamakawa, Labor Law Reform in Japan: A Response to Recent Socio-Economic Changes, 49 
AM. J. COMP. L. 627, 628-29 (2001). 
26 See DOERINGER & PIORE, supra note 14, at 164-83 (discussing the existence and its economic 
implications of the dual labor market in the US). 
27 It is said that atypical workers have been dismissed before regular workers in recession and therefore 
served as buffers. See Yamakawa, supra note 25, at 629. 
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management, strictly distinct treatment of regular and non-regular workers and so on.28   
Alternative interpretations on the JEC and its economic success have been 
provided by using psychological or comparative-sociological approach such as amae 
(dependence) or Confucianism where the nature of the JEC is attributed to the 
mentality or spiritual tradition inherent in Japan. 29  However, this culture-based 
explanation of Japanese industrial relations is doubtful first because the custom that is 
observed, at least partially, for all developed capitalist countries other than Japan.  
It is also questionable from the historical point of view. As pointed out by 
several researchers, this custom did not exist from the beginning of the Japanese 
economy. It was newly established in the 1940s during World War II as a part of 
wartime economic regulations, and maintained itself through the democratization 
program to strengthen the position of laborers led by the Allied High Command after 
the war.30 The Japanese management has retained this method from the high growth 
                                                  
28 See, e.g., JAMES C. ABEGGLEN & GEORGE STALK JR., KAISHA, THE JAPANESE CORPORATION 198-99 
(1985) (attributing these properties of Japanese firms to the group-oriented nature of Japanese). 
29 For the brief summary of the cultural theory of Japanese industrial relations, see MARCUS REBICK, THE 
JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM 18-19 (2005). Abegglen & Stalks Jr. asserted that Japan as 
group-centered society which was formed by the value system based on the Confucian ethic. ABEGGLEN 
& STALKS JR., supra note 28, at 198. See also RONALD DORE, TAKING JAPAN SERIOUSLY (1987) 
(asserting the contribution of Confucianism on the Japanese system of enterprise and society); MICHIO 
MORISHIMA, WHY HAS JAPAN SUCCEEDED (1982) (analyzing the effect of Confucianism adapted to Japan 
on the economic development of Japan since Meiji Restoration). 
30 See, e.g., WILLIAM. B. GOULD, JAPAN’S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 17-43, 106-16 (1984); 
 12
period until the 1980s, since it displayed a good performance during the period. Before 
the 1940s, the Japanese economy had a classical market system with a competitive 
labor market that facilitated the highly frequent turnover of workers. The possibility of 
permanent employment and participation of labor in management was very limited, 
and labor unions were industry-based, not enterprise-based unions, as observed in other 
developed countries.31 
B. Appraisal from the Theoretical Point of View 
 The JEC is usually characterized by its egalitarianism based on the LTER and 
the seniority system with respect to promotion and remuneration.32 However, in reality, 
the process of promotion and remuneration is far more meritocratic than it appears, 
based on the assessments of the employer. In addition, on-the-job training (OJT 
hereafter) activity is linked to the process of frequent rotations to accumulate workers’ 
firm specific human capital. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Tetsuji Okazaki, The Japanese Firm under the Wartime Planned Economy, in THE JAPANESE FIRM: 
SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH 350, 357-59 & 369-70 (Masahiko Aoki & Ronald Dore eds. 1994). 
31 For the detailed explanation of the situation of the labor market in Japan before 1940’s, see W. 
Galenson & Konosuke Odaka, The Japanese Labor Market , in ASIA’S NEW GIANT: HOW THE JAPANESE 
ECONOMY WORKS 614 (Hugh Patrick & Henry Rosovsky eds. 1976). See also ANDREW GORDON, THE 
EVOLUTION OF LABOR RELATIONS IN JAPAN (1985) (survey on the historical development of Japanese 
labor relations).  
32 See, e.g., ITOH, supra note 2, at 210-13 (summarizing this conventional wisdom for Japanese industrial 
relations). 
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 It has been observed that production systems do not only deal with routine 
work, even if it appears to be a highly technological process that should be optimized 
with respect to the engineering methods.33  There are always uncertain accidents, 
demand shocks, or technological innovations that require adjustments in the production 
system.  According to Koike, human capital and termed intellectual skills become 
necessary to deal with this problem. 34  This is common knowledge related to the 
production system to which the laborer belongs and which is developed by the Japanese 
OJT that requires workers to train in a broad class of jobs.35 Japanese firms have an 
advantage in coping with unexpected shocks by using the accumulated first-hand 
knowledge of workers on the production process.36 This is combined with a work 
organization that has a broader division of jobs and in which authority is delegated to 
the lower tiers of workers in the production hierarchy. This approach has allowed 
Japanese firms to frequently experience higher productivity than other developed 
countries.  
 Such a system succeeds only when workers are offered incentives for making 
efforts to accumulate strictly firm-specific intellectual skills. This includes the 
                                                  
33 See KOIKE, supra note 6, at 63. 
34 Id. at 63-68. 
35 Id. at 68-72. 
36 Id. at 241-59. 
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willingness to rotate among various types of jobs depending on the economic 
environment or the process of OJT, and the willingness of senior workers to accept and 
train young workers on the job. It is well-known from the classical human capital theory 
that a competitive labor market does not ensure an efficient level of investment in 
firm-specific human capital.37 Owing to the firm-specific nature, firms do not have an 
incentive to pay for workers’ investment effort, and given this expectation, workers lose 
their incentive to invest. Even explicit contractual arrangements cannot solve the 
problem due to the problem of third-party verifiability.38  As courts cannot observe the 
level of human capital investment, a worker will not invest if he is paid prior to 
investment: further, he will be less motivated to invest as he cannot rely on a firm’s 
promise to pay later for the same reason of verifiability. 
 To solve the problem of under-investment in firm-specific human capital, it is 
necessary to provide incentives for workers to invest and for firms to pay appropriately 
for the workers’ efforts: i.e. the LTER should be a self-enforcing implicit contract that 
does not involve verifiability problems.  Several features of the JEC listed in the 
                                                  
37 See, e.g., Jacob Mincer, Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution, 66 J. POL. 
ECON. 281 (1958); Jacob Mincer, On-the-job Training: Costs, Returns and Some Implications, 70 J. POL. 
ECON. 50 (1962) ; GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH 
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (2d ed. 1975). 
38 It is a basic problem taken up by the incomplete contract theory. See Oliver E. Hart & John Moore, 
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988). 
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previous section can be understood as a system to provide incentives for workers to 
invest in human capital. 
 One important trait of the Japanese LTER is that the short-run pay is inelastic 
to observable performance measures. At first sight, the compensation related to 
performance indexes such as output, sales, or profits appears to stimulate workers’ 
efforts. However, this type of an incentive payment encourages workers to improve their 
short-run performance, without being interested in the accumulation of intellectual 
skills that are useful in the long run. Therefore, this type of compensation may sacrifice 
long-term productivity gains to short-run performance due to the accumulation of 
intellectual skills.39 
 When the observable performance measures do not completely reflect the efforts of 
workers and the direct monitoring of workers is not very expensive, this type of 
incentive pay does not hold any advantage for firms. These two conditions apply to 
Japanese organizations in which the group production system is developed and in which 
the management is more concerned with long-term efficiency. This is the main reason 
                                                  
39 See Hideshi Itoh, Japanese Human Resource Management from the Viewpoint of Incentive Theory, in 
THE JAPANESE FIRM: SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH, supra note 30, at 233, 240-57 (arguing that 
the Japanese system of human resource allocation and remuneration is both rational and efficient). 
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that this type of short-run incentive pay has not prevailed in Japan.40  
 In the JEC where wage payment is inelastic to both short-run performances 
and types of jobs, the incentive to work hard and train is provided by the promotion 
process and the associated increase in wages that occurs in the long run. As explained in 
the previous section, merit assessment matters more than seniority, and the lifetime 
earning differences among workers are considerably large.41 As promotion is based on 
subjective assessments rather than objective measures, the effort of workers is more 
effectively aligned with the intentions of the management. 
This process of promotion can be interpreted as a type of tournament wherein 
firms are committed to the lifetime employment of workers and their appropriate 
                                                  
40 In other developed countries such as the U.S., it is also known that the remuneration system is not very 
elastic to the short-run performance indexes, at least for large companies and with the exception of the 
compensations for executives, although this tendency is not as conspicuous as in the case of Japan. 
However, they adopt a different system of remuneration from Japan in that wages are directly attached to 
jobs instead of persons. See DOERINGER & PIORE, supra note 14, at 65-71. This system of wages 
determined by the types and difficulties of jobs also works as a strong incentive device to increase 
workers’ efforts, since this system works as a tournament among workers for the limited number of good 
positions. For a theoretical analysis of this type of economy, see Lorne Carmichael, Firm-Specific Human 
Capital and Promotion Ladders, 14 BELL J. ECON. 251 (1983); James. M. Malcomson, Work Incentives, 
Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 486 (1984); W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. 
Malcomson, Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment, 96 J. POL. ECON. 832 (1988). 
However, this system is not effective for the accumulation of intellectual skills either, since workers do 
not have an interest in learning broad class jobs or in helping to develop the skills of other workers. This 
system is also the cause of organizational inflexibility in a changing environment, since any drastic 
change in the job design is protested by the workers in high positions in the hierarchy. 
41 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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remuneration.42 Here, the management determines the position of workers in the 
hierarchy depending on seniority and their long-term performance at the workplace. 
This mechanism provides sufficient incentives for workers to work hard and invest into 
firm-specific capital provided that the promise of the firm to remunerate workers is 
reliable.   
 Unfortunately, this system has a disadvantage in that it may protect against 
the moral hazard that firms renege on the wage payment to workers who do make 
sufficient efforts. As the amount of effort and wage which should be payed for that effort 
cannot be completely verified, the firm has an incentive to cut the wages of workers, 
although their job performance and accumulation of firm specific human capital are 
sufficient. Owing to this absence of credibility, workers are not willing to invest in 
human capital, and the LTER will fail.  
 To rectify this disadvantage, this implicit contract should be self-enforcing 
through the bargaining between the employer and the labor union. Here, employers 
must keep their promise of remuneration in order to protect their reputation because 
they fear that labor unions will retaliate in the future by not cooperating with the 
                                                  
42 The idea of tournament was originally provided in Carmichael and Malcomson. See Carmichael, supra 
note 40; Malcomson, supra note 40. Then it was adapted to the analysis of Japanese labor relations. See 
Kanemoto & MacLeod, supra note 7; Yoshitsugu Kanemoto & W. Bentley MacLeod, Firm Reputation 
and Self-Enforcing Labor Contracts, 6 J. JAPANESE & INT’L ECON. 144 (1992). 
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management.43 For example, they might go on a strike or bargain for a higher wage 
increase or better working conditions in the following year’s negotiations. As a result of 
this negotiation process, it may succeed in attaining efficient reputation equilibria in 
the long run. 
C. Interpretation of the Stylized Facts and Some Other Implications Derived from 
Economic Theory 
      The theoretical analysis in section II.B. makes the rationalistic interpretation of 
the stylized facts in the JEC possible. Long-term employment and seniority wages are 
actually interpreted as devices to provide incentives to workers for the efficient 
accumulation of firm-specific skills, 44  and ambiguous job demarcation and the 
delegation of authorities to the lower tiers of production hierarchies are regarded as 
mechanisms facilitating the use of firm-specific skills for the improvement of the 
production system. 45  The intra-firm labor union is used for the communication 
between labor and management, and the negotiation in the intra-firm is more 
                                                  
43 See Kanemoto & MacLeod, supra note 42 (applying the reputation effect to the analysis of Japanese 
firms.). The reputation effect was first put into economic analysis by Klein and Leffler. Benjamin Klein & 
Keith. B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 
(1981).  
44 See supra notes 41 & 42 and accompanying text. 
45 See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text. 
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important than an industry-wide problem.46  The dual nature of the Japanese labor 
market can be naturally understood as the returns provided to the regular workers 
for their extra effort in investment into the firm-specific human capital, which was 
not necessary for non-regular workers. 
To explain why certain efficient traits that characterize the Japanese LTER are 
observed in the Western countries, but only for white-collar workers in large firms, it is 
necessary to consider the conditions for the bargaining process between labor and 
management in order to perform effectively. It is well known that the coordination of 
expectations between two players is necessary for attaining efficient reputation 
equilibrium.47 More concretely, firms should build a good reputation to keep their 
promises with the workers.       
This observation seems to imply that the Japanese system of management can 
only be introduced for the class of workers that is relatively protected against the 
business cycle or technical innovations, since it is this type of workers that firms can 
keep promises regarding remuneration for long time and their words become credible. It 
                                                  
46 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
47 For the general discussion on this issue, see, e.g., David Pearce, Repeated Games: Cooperation and 
Rationality in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY: SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS 132 (Jean-Jacques Laffont ed. 
1992); DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY ch. 5 (1991). 
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is exactly the class of workers that belong to white-collar in the large companies. 48           
This theoretical argument further provides some insight on the relative decline of 
the effectiveness of the JEC. The world economy after the 1990s is partly characterized 
by the drastic technological progress led mainly by the development of information 
technology and financial engineering.49 When new businesses and industries came into 
existence, old technologies became obsolete within a short span of time. As the merit of 
JEC lies in the accumulation of firm-specific knowledge in the long run, it is more 
effective in an economic environment growing at a stable rate and with relatively small 
technical changes. It is therefore said that Japan needs a new system of labor relations 
and labor market to cope with this change.50 
  
III. Structure of the Japanese Labor Law  
A. Historical Origin 
 Section II.A indicated that the Japanese employment custom was introduced 
during the 1940s through wartime regulations, developed during the high economic 
                                                  
48 If firms in other countries do not have a good reputation, workers will strongly oppose the introduction 
of the Japanese system of management, which gives more discretionary power to the employer. See 
Kanemoto & MacLeod, supra note 42, at 146.  
49 See REBICK, supra note 29, at 41-42 (discussing this technical change and its effect on the career 
patterns of standard employees in Japan). 
50 See, e.g., id. at 32. 
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growth period, and was well established by the Oil Shock that occurred in the 1970s.51 
 The labor law was not sufficiently developed before World War II. There were 
several laws that regulated individual labor relations, such as protecting minor or 
female laborers, determining minimum safety standards, and number of working 
hours.52 There were also laws for regulating employment agencies and the requirement 
of workers’ accident compensation insurance.53 In addition, during war times some laws 
were enacted to control minimum wage54 and work time.55 These laws formed the basis 
of the enactment of the post-World-War-II laws, but they were very insufficient as 
compared to today’s standards.  Many tragic cases concerning the working conditions 
of laborers, particularly female or minors, have been reported.56 Furthermore, labor 
movements were repressed under criminal law, and efforts to legislate labor unions met 
                                                  
51 See supra notes 30 & 31 and accompanying text. 
52 Kōjōhō, [Factory Law] Law No. 46 of 1911; Kōjōhō Shikourei [Ordinance for Enforcement of Factory 
Law], Imperial Ordinance No. 193 of 1916.These had been repealed when Labor Standards Law (Rōdō 
Kijunhō) were enacted in 1947. 
53 Rōdōsha Saigai Fujohō [Worker’s Injury Assistance Law], Law No. 54 of 1931; Rōdōsha Saigai Fujo 
Hokenhō [Worker’s Injury Assistance Insurance Law], Law No. 54 of 1931. 
54 Chingin Tōseirei [Wage Control Ordinance], Imperial Ordinance No. 128 of 1937. 
55 Kōjō Shūgyō Jikanrei [Factory Employment Hours Ordinance], Imperial Ordinance No. 127 of 1937.  
56 Those tragedies can be easily found in reports by government agencies, in nonfiction books, and in 
novels in those days. See, e.g., NŌSHOUMUSHŌ [Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce], SHŌKOU JIJŌ 
[Commercial and Industrial Affairs] (1903). 
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with failure, until the end of the war.57 
 The situation changed drastically after the war. The Allied High Command 
promoted a social policy for protecting workers and their Labor Union activities, as a 
part of its democratization program toward Japan. The Labor Union Law was enacted 
in 194558 and it was revised in 1949 to its present form.59 At the same time, with the 
support of the new law and reflecting the urgent economic conditions of the post war 
period, the union density (rate of the union membership among workers) exceeded 
50%.60 
 In addition, there were changes in the area of individual labor relations.  The 
New Constitution of 194661 established the basic right to work, defined the principles 
                                                  
57 See KAZUO SUGENO, JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 5-8 (Leo Kanowitz trans. 2002). 
Although great deal of effort had been put into legislating laws for unions from 1919, it finally failed in 
1931. But many discussions had been made in that process and this made rapid legislation of union laws 
just after World War II possible. See id. at 7-8; KAZUO SUGENO, RŌDŌHŌ [Labor Law] 5-6 (7th 
supplemented 2d ed. 2007). 
58 Rōdō Kumiaihō [Labor union Law], Law No. 51 of 1945. 
59 Rōdō Kumiaihō [Labor union Law], Law No. 174 of 1949. For brief summary on formation and 
amendment of Labor Union Law in English, see Mitsunari Doko, The Labor Relations Commission as an 
Organization to Resolve Collective Labor Disputes, 3 JAPAN LABOR REV., no.1, at 32, 32-35 (2006). 
60 KŌSEI RŌDŌSHOU [Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare], RŌDŌKUMIAI KISO CHŌSA 
JIKEIRETSUHYOU DAI 1 HYOU [Basic Survey on Labor Union Table 1] (2006) (indicating that in 1947 the 
union density rate had been 45.3% and it increased to 53.0% in the next year. In 1949, the year in which 
present Labor Union Law was legislated, the rate raised to 55.8%). 
61 KENPŌ [The Constitution of Japan]. 
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for the legislation on labor conditions,62 and guaranteed the right to organize and 
bargain and act collectively.63 In 1947, the Labor Standards Law64 and the Workers’ 
Accident Compensation Law65 were promulgated, which complemented the insufficient 
pre-war laws and raised the level of protection of laborers to the International Labour 
Organization’s (ILO) International Labour Standards. Further, the basic laws on 
unemployment were voted during this period to cope with the disastrous labor market 
conditions.66 The basic framework of the Japanese labor law was constructed between 
1945 and 1955 and continues to be used even today.67 
B. Basic Principles 
 Next, we will describe the basic principles on which the Japanese labor law is 
founded. First, as well as in other contracts, there is freedom of contract and 
consequently the contract between a worker and an employer is enforceable.68 In reality, 
                                                  
62 See id. art. 27 (providing that standards of working conditions including wage, rest time shall be set up 
by law). 
63 See id. art. 28. 
64 Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No.49 of 1947.  
65 Rōdōsha Saigai Hoshou Hokenhō [Workers’ Accident Compensation Law], Law No. 50 of 1947. 
66 To cope with unemployment caused by deflationary policies under Dodge Line, Unemployment 
Insurance Law was amended and Emergency Countermeasures Law was enacted. See SUGENO, supra 
note 57, at 9-10. For details of situation of employment in these days, see RŌDŌSHOU [Ministry of 
Labour], SHOWA 24 NEN RŌDŌ KEIZAI NO BUNSEKI [Analysis of Labor Economics 1947] ch.2 (1947).  
67 See SUGENO, supra note 57, at 8-10. 
68 See id. at 3-4. Freedom of contract is a basic principle in Civil Law. Without laws modifying or 
restricting this freedom, parties of contracts are free to agree upon whatever provisions they want and it 
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it is not so free as it may first appear. It is commonly explained as follows. Since the 
bargaining power between workers and employers is extremely unequal, labor contracts 
can be rather unfair and unreasonable in determining the terms of working conditions.69 
Hence supporting the laborers who only have a weak bargaining power in order to 
rectify this unfair distribution of the bargaining power and to facilitate the attachment 
of fair and reasonable agreements in labor contracts is justifiable.70 
 For this purpose, there are three approaches adopted in the Japanese labor law.  
First, it provides compulsory minimum standards for working conditions such as 
wages, 71  working hours, 72  and safety. 73  They are regarded as protecting workers 
against unfair outcomes that arise when the conditions for labor is completely left for 
free negotiations between them.74 
There are also regulations against discriminatory treatment. Once hired, 
                                                                                                                                                  
will be enforceable, as long as it is not against public policy. MINPŌ [Civil Code], art. 90 (providing that 
contracts and other acts should be nullified if it is against public policies). Labor laws function as a 
restriction on this freedom. 
69 See id. at 76. 
70 See id. 
71 See Saitei Chinginhō [Minimum Wage Law], Law No. 137 of 1959, art. 5, paras. 1 & 2. For details, 
see infra note 131 and accompanying text. 
72 See Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No.49 of 1947, art. 32, paras. 1 & 2. 
73 See id. art. 42; Rōdo Anzen Eiseihō [Labor Safety and Health Law], Law No. 57 of 1982. 
74 See SUGENO, supra note 57, at 18. 
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employers may not treat employees discriminatory by race, sex, ideology, and so on.75 
While discriminatory treatment by nationality, race, ideology and others are explicitly 
prohibited only after workers are hired (i.e. discrimination at the stage of recruitment 
and hiring is not explicitly restricted), discriminatory treatment by sex at the stage of 
recruitment and hiring employers, such as excluding female from recruiting, 76  is 
severely prohibited by Equal Employment Opportunity Law.77 It has long been argued 
that Japanese female workers are discriminated against in the recruitment process and 
in their treatment within the firm: therefore, they are unable to hold regular positions 
in the LTER.78 To rectify this situation, the Equal Employment Opportunity Law79 was 
                                                  
75 See Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No.49 of 1947, arts. 3 & 4 (prohibiting discriminatory 
treatment of employees in general); Koyō no Bunya ni okeru Danjo no Kintōna Kikai oyobi Taigū no 
Kakuho ni Kansuru Hōritsu [Equal Employment Opportunity Law], Law No. 113 of 1972, arts. 5-9 
(prohibiting especially discrimination by gender). 
76 See Rōdōsha ni taisuru Seibetsu wo riyū to suru Sabetsu no Kinshitou ni kansuru Kitei ni sadameru 
Jikou ni kanshi, Jigyounushi ga Tekisetsu ni Taisho surutameno Shishin [Guidelines on Appropriate 
Measures Employers should Take concerning Provisions Prohibiting Sexual Discrimination of Worker], 
2006 RŌKOKU 164, art. 2, para. 2, item 2. 
77 Koyō no Bunya ni okeru Danjo no Kintō na Kikai oyobi Taigū no Kakuho ni Kansuru Hōritsu [Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law], Law No. 113 of 1972, art. 5. The Duty of employers to provide women 
with equal opportunities as compared with men was not mandatory until 1997 amendments of Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law. For the 1997 amendments, see Yamakawa, supra note 25, at 636-40.  
78 This difficulty can be explained by using the statistical theory of discrimination. See Edmund Phelps, 
The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659 (1972); Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Approaches to the Economics of Discrimination, 63 AM. ECON. REV 287 (1973). Japanese firms require 
workers who work on a long-term basis to accumulate firm-specific human capital. In this sense, female 
laborers have a high risk of early retirement to raise their children, as it is difficult to determine whether 
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enacted in 1985 and developed to its present form in 1997.80 
Second, to rectify the unequal bargaining power between labor and 
management, it guarantees workers the right to bargain collectively by forming 
unions.81 Third, to improve the labor market mechanism, information and employment 
placement service is provided by public employment agencies,82 and those seeking 
                                                                                                                                                  
individual female workers really wish to work in the long run. This provides sufficient reason to firms to 
treat female workers unfavorably, even if they have no discriminatory ideas. 
79 Koyō no Bunya ni okeru Danjo no Kintō na Kikai oyobi Taigū no Kakuho ni Kansuru Hōritsu [Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law], Law No. 113 of 1972. 
80 See ARAKI, supra note 21, at 108-22. The harmonization of work and family life has been one of the 
top legal policy agenda in order to cope with those problems. There has been a steady increase with 
regard to the share of female labor force holding permanent positions in firms in Japan from 1975 until 
today. See REBICK, supra note 29, at 113-18, Tbl. 7.2 (explaining recent extension of female labor force 
in Japan and indicating that the percentage of women in management posts has drastically increased since 
1980s). It shows that this problem will be expected to disappear gradually for the reasons below. First, 
Japanese society is rapidly aging and hence it is essential for firms to employ female labor force as 
regular employees. Second, along with the change of industrial structure, the importance of the LTER is 
relatively diminishing, and the reduction and increased flexibility of working hours has been realized 
partly supported by the reform of labor law. 
81 See KENPŌ [The Constitution of Japan], art. 28. Rights and privileges of labor unions and duties of 
employers are provided in Labor Union Law (Rōdō Kumiaihō). For example, Labor Union Law provides 
exemption from criminal punishment for actions in appropriate strikes. Rōdō Kumiaihō [Labor union 
Law], Law No. 174 of 1949, art. 1, para. 2. See also KEIHŌ [Penal Code], art. 35.  
82 See Shokugyou Anteihō [Employment Security Law], Law No. 141 of 1947, art. 5. Until 1999, private 
employment placement service was strictly restricted to only few jobs and employment placement service 
was generally provided by governmental agencies. In 1999 amendments of Employment Security Law 
and Worker’s Dispatching Law, this regulation was largely changed to liberalize restrictions on private 
employment placement service and to remove governmental monopolization. See Takashi Araki, 1999 
Revisions of Employment Security Law and Worker Dispatching Law: Drastic Reforms of Japanese 
Labor Market Regulations, 38 JAPAN LABOR BULLETIN, no.9, at 5, 5-12 (1999); Yamakawa, supra note 
25, at 642. 
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employment can receive subsidies, which includes unemployment benefits.83 
 
C. The Long-Term Employment Relationship and the Protection of Employment 
Section II.A. pointed out a stylized fact that the LTER prevails in the 
above-middle sized Japanese companies. Due to the nature of LTER, considerable part 
of the woriking conditions is not explicitly written in the individual contracts. 84  
Therefore, work rules (shūgyou kisoku) and collective agreements among union(s) and 
employer (Rōdō Kyouyaku) become important since they have a function of filling the 
                                                  
83 See generally Koyō Hokenhō [Employment Insurance Law], Law No. 116 of 1974; Rōdō Hoken no 
Hokenryō no Choushūtō ni kansuru Hōritsu [Law Concerning Collection of Labor Insurance Premium], 
Law No. 84 of 1973. 
84 See infra section III D. As for the term of labor contract, it had been severely restricted to write a 
fixed- term labor contract. Before 1998 amendment, article 14 of Labor Standards Law in principle 
prohibited fixed-term labor contracts that last longer than one year. See Hiroya Nakakubo, The 2003 
Revision of the Labor Standards Law: Fixed-term contracts, Dismissal and Discretionary-work Schemes, 
2 JAPAN LABOR REV., no.1, at 4, 7 (2004). This restriction was said to protect workers from being bound 
too long and therefore being deprived of freedom of resignation. See SUGENO, supra note 57, at 188-91. 
Since it can be circumvented easily and the fear of obligatory servitude became obsolete, the restrictions 
have been gradually liberalized. See Takashi Araki, Changing Employment Practices, Corporate 
Governance, and the Role of Labor Law in Japan, 28 COMP. LABOR L. & POL’Y J. 251, 276-77 (2007). 
  1998 amendment made certain exceptions: for certain types of labor contracts, such as scientific 
research, the maximum period may be three years. See Yamakawa, supra note 25, at 632. Further 
liberalizations were made in 2003 amendment. In the amendment, maximum period for all types of labor 
contracts became three years. Also, for certain types of contracts maximum period was extended from 
three years to five years. See KŌSEI ROŌDŌSHOU [Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare], KAISEI RŌDŌ 
KIJUNHŌ NO GAIYOU [Summary of Amended Labor Standards Law] 2 (2003), available at 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/2003/11/dl/tp1111-1a.pdf. 
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gaps. Also statutory and case law that restrict the power of employer wil be critical in 
some situation such as dismissals.  
The LTER is not the same as a series of contracts, which are renegotiated and 
updated every one to five years but is “a type of labor contract that has not specified its 
duration”.85 Under Civil Code, both parties of this type of contract can cancel the 
contract at will: i.e. employers have the freedom to dismiss employees and workers have 
the freedom to resign. Civil Code provides that both employers and employees can 
terminate labor contract without fixed-term at their will and in this event labor 
contracts will be terminated two weeks after the request to terminate is made.86 Also 
Labor Standards Law traditionally had provided only few explicit restrictions on 
dismissal.87  
But the freedom of dismissal has been strictly restricted under the doctrine of 
abusive dismissal that has been formed by case law. This doctrine has its foundation in 
the basic principle of Civil Law which prohibits abusive exercise of rights.88 This 
principle of the abusive exercise of a right was first applied to the dismissal disputes 
                                                  
85 See Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No.49 of 1947, art. 14, para. 1. 
86 MINPŌ [Civil Code], art. 627, para. 1. 
87 E.g., Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No.49 of 1947, art. 19 (prohibiting dismissal during 
periods of leave by maternity or by injury or illness caused by work.). See SUGENO, supra note 57, at 474. 
88 See MINPŌ [Civil Code], art. 1 para. 3. 
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through the accumulation of a majority of judicial decisions by the lower courts, which 
commenced immediately after the war and was particularly confirmed during and after 
the 1973 Oil Shock.89 It was endorsed by the Supreme Court’s decision in the late 
1970s.90 Then the doctrine of abusive dismissal had been codified in Labor Standards 
Law in 2003,91 and the provision has been moved into new Employment Contract Law92 
that came into force on March 2008.93   
In sum, employers can dismiss workers only when there are reasonable grounds 
                                                  
89 For the formation of doctrine of abusive dismissal, see Ryuichi Yamakawa, Nihon no Kaikohōsei 
[Japanese Law of Dismissal], in KAIKOHŌSEI WO KANGAERU [Examining Law of Dismissal] 3, 4-7 
(Fumio Ohtake et al. eds., 2002). 
90 E.g., Ichilawa v. Nihon Shokuen Seizou K.K., 29 MINSHŪ 456, 457-58 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 25, 1975); 
Shiota v. Kōchi Hōsō K.K., 268 RŌDŌ HANREI 17, 18-19 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 31, 1977). 
91 Before 2003 amendment, Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No.49 of 1947, art. 18-2 
provided: 
A dismissal shall, where the dismissal lacks objectively reasonable grounds and is not 
considered to be appropriate in general societal terms, be treated as an abuse of that right and 
invalid. 
Id., translated in LABOR STANDARDS ACT 13 (Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training 
trans. 2003). 
For a brief summary of doctrine of abusive dismissal and 2003 amendment, see Nakakubo, supra note 84, 
at 13-18. For about new Employment Contract Act, see infra note 92. 
92 Rōdō Keiyakuhō [Employment Contract Law], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 16. This provision is 
identical to the former article 18-2 of Labor Standards Law and the latter provision was deleted from 
Labor Standards Law according to the legislation of new Employment Contract Law. See id. 
Supplementary provision art. 2 (providing the deletion of former articles 18-2 of Labor Standards Law). 
93 The Japanese approach on employment protection ranges between the level of European countries such 
as Germany and France, wherein there are explicit legislations regulating dismissals and in Anglo Saxon 
countries (US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) wherein the at-will based employment policy is 
adopted. See OECD, OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2006, at 96 & fig. 3.9 (2006). 
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to do so.94 The doctrine required that to dismiss an employee, there must be objectively 
reasonable grounds so that it could receive general social approval.95 For example, an 
order of dismissal based simply on the subjective sentiment of the employer cannot be 
passed under this principle. When the decision of dismissal is judged illegal, employer is 
compelled to continue the relationship96: moreover, as the labor contract relationship 
has continued during the period between the invalid dismissal and the judgment 
voiding the dismissal, workers can claim the wages for this period.97 
 This doctrine was originally formed in the case when the behavior of an 
individual worker is not appropriate. Then during the recession, particularly after the 
1973 Oil Shock this doctrine was extended to the case of adjustment dismissal.98 This 
was the time when the Japanese custom of employment adjustment was firmly 
                                                  
94 See SUGENO, supra note 57, at 479. 
95 See, e.g., Nihon Shokuen Seizo, 29 MINSHŪ at 457; Kōchi Hōsō, 268 RŌDŌ HANREI at 18. 
96 See Rōdō Keiyakuhō [Employment Contract Law], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 16 (providing that such 
dismissal will be invalid). See also SUGENO, supra note 57, at 482. This does not always mean that 
employers must put the abusively dismissed workers on the position he had assumed before. Rather it 
protects workers because the employer must pay wages as long as the labor contract is in effect. See 
Yamakawa, supra note 89, at 8. In sum, this provides an incentive to the employers who dismissed an 
employee unduly to restore her on an appropriate position or to negotiate with her for voluntary 
resignation. In the latter case, the employer will be paying some extra compensation. 
97 See SUGENO, supra note 57, at 483.  
98 See, e.g., Shimazaki v. Tōyō Sanso K.K., 330 RŌDŌ HANREI 71, 78-79 (Tokyo High Ct., Oct. 29, 
1979) (indicating that the doctrine of abusive dismissal rights is applied to the cases of adjustment 
dismissals); Miyake v. Asahi Jigyou Kyoukai Charitable Corp., 427 RŌDŌ HANREI 63, 64 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 
27, 1983). See also Yamakawa, supra note 89, at 8-9. 
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established. This custom was in sharp contrast with the system in the U.S., wherein a 
shortage of demand is promptly adjusted to by laying off workers.99 At least in the large 
companies in Japan, dismissal was avoided by restricting overtime work, suspending 
mid-career hiring, transferring and farming out workers to related companies, 
terminating the employment of non-regular workers, and soliciting voluntary 
retirement by old workers.100 Dismissing typical workers was not regarded as the first 
option employers should take in recessions.  
 The Doctrine of Abusive Dismissal required the four conditions below as just 
causes for the adjustment dismissal101: 
(1) the urgent necessity of dismissal for the continuation of management, 
(2) duty of efforts to avoid dismissal, 
(3) propriety of the selection criteria for the dismissed,  
(4) procedural propriety. 
  Condition (1) is the presupposition for adjustment dismissal.102 In judging 
                                                  
99 See KOIKE, supra note 6, at 92-94 (about the system of employment adjustment in the US). 
100 Courts recognize that workers normally expect for lifetime employment and firms employ workers on 
the premise that workers would expect so. See, e.g., Miyake v. Asahi Jigyou Kyoukai Charitable Corp., 
427 RŌDŌ HANREI 64, 65-66 (Fukuoka High Ct., Oct. 24, 1979); Echi v. Chiyoda Kakō Kensetsu K.K., 
629 RŌDŌ HANREI 19, 23 (Tokyo High Ct., Mar. 31, 1993).  
101 See, e.g., Tōyō Sanso, 330 RŌDŌ HANREI at 78-79. See also SUGENO, supra note, at 487-89. 
102 See, e.g., Toyoda v. Maruman K.K., 787 RŌDŌ HANREI 18, 27 (Osaka D. Ct., May 8, 2000) 
(indicating that necessity for adjustment dismissal had decreased and invalidated the dismissal.). 
 32
condition (1), Japanese courts have taken a view that adjustment dismissal should be 
reasonable means to resolve present or future deficits.103 As mentioned just above, even 
when there are deficits, courts regarded that adjustment dismissal is a solution that can 
be selected only after reasonable efforts to avoid dismissal are taken.104 Thus, in courts’ 
view, employers should first search some ways to avoid adjustment dismissal.105 With 
regard to condition (3), if there are no objective standards for the selection or if the 
standards are deemed objectively unreasonable, the adjustment dismissal will be 
void.106 Condition (4), virtually implies the duty to explain and consult with the Labor 
Union in good faith, and is consistent with the method of employment adjustment of 
Japanese firms stated above.107  
When the disputed dismissal is judged as being void, the employer must pay the 
wages for the period in which he was dismissed, in the same way as in the case of 
                                                  
103 See, e.g., Tōyō Sanso, 330 RŌDŌ HANREI at 78-79. 
104 See, e.g., id. at 78; Asahi Jigyou Kyoukai, 427 RŌDŌ HANREI at 64; Maruman, 787 RŌDŌ HANREI at 
28.  
105 But this is not to mean that employers should test all available means before dismissing workers for 
adjustment. See, e.g., Hirata v. Nakamichi K.K., 775 RŌDŌ HANREI 71, 80-81 (Tokyo High Ct., July 23, 
1999) (rejecting the argument of plaintiff workers that defendant firm could have taken means other than 
adjustment dismissal such as work sharing on the ground that those means did not seem to function well 
in the defendant corporation.). 
106 See SUGENO, supra note 57, at 489. 
107 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
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individual dismissals. 108  Contrary to European countries,109  the option to end the 
employment relationship without an agreement of the worker, but in exchange for the 
payment of some compensation when the dismissal is judged as void is not permissible 
in Japan. 
 
D. The Long-Term Employment Relationship as Relational Contract 
 The LTER is essentially incomplete in terms of aspects other than employment 
duration as well, due to its nature of relational contract under the condition of bounded 
rationality.  
First, the LTER takes the form of a group contract, the contents of which are 
specified by the work rules (shūgyou kisoku), which generally apply to all workers in a 
firm.110 In most developed countries, the outline of the rules of a firm is regulated by the 
minimum standards set by the collective bargaining at the industry level, and the 
co-determination system between employer and workers’ council decides the details of 
the rules.111   
                                                  
108 For the effect of invalid dismissals, see supra notes 96 & 97 and accompanying text. 
109 See ARAKI, supra note 21, at 27. 
110 See Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No.49 of 1947, arts. 89, 92 & 93; Rōdō Keiyakuhō 
[Employment Contract Law], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 7. 
111 See SUGENO, supra note 57, at 495-96. 
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In Japan, the employer’s right to set the work rules is the basic norm in the 
LTER. The employer has the power to set the rules and an inclusive right of direction 
and orders to the employees.112 The Labor Standards Law requires every employer to 
frame work rules with regard to the main items113 and to make them known to all 
workers.114 The framing and the change of work rules must be submitted to the public 
agency known as the Labor Standards Inspection Office〔Rōdō Kijun Kantokusho〕 so 
that they are supervised as being subject to the legal regulations and collective 
agreements among employers and workers.115 As such, the work rules substantially 
govern the labor contract.  
It is therefore important to reflect the opinions of laborers within its content.  
Its most developed form is the co-determination system in Germany, wherein work rules 
are determined with the consent of the workers’ council.116 If there is no agreement, 
                                                  
112 See Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No.49 of 1947, art. 90; Rōdō Keiyakuhō 
[Employment Contract Law], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 7. See also SUGENO, supra note 57, at 115-19. 
113 Rōdō Keiyakuhō [Employment Contract Law], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 11; Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor 
Standards Law], Law No.49 of 1947, art. 89, paras. 1-10. 
114 Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No.49 of 1947, art. 106, para. 1; Rōdō Kijunhō 
Shikoukisoku [Ordinance for Enforcing Labor Standards Law], Ministry of Health and Welfare 
Ordinance No. 23 of 1947, art. 52-2. 
115 See Rōdō Keiyakuhō [Employment Contract Law], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 11; Rōdō Kijunhō 
[Labor Standards Law], Law No.49 of 1947, art. 89 & art. 92, para. 2. 
116 See SUGENO, supra note 57, at 113. 
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then it is arbitrated by a public agency.117  
In Japan, it is obligatory for the employer to seek the workers’ opinions.118 
However, it does not mean that employees (or union(s) of the firm) have veto power 
regarding the changes of work rules. If there is an agreement on changes of working 
conditions among workers and employer, the changes will be effective.119 In principle, if 
the amendment of the work rule is against workers’ interest, it is necessary to gain the 
consent of the workers. 120  However, there are an important exception on the 
amendment of work rules: even if it is against the interest of workers, employers can 
amend the work rules and consequently change the working conditions unilaterally 
when the following two conditions are met.121  
                                                  
117 KAZUO SUGENO, SHIN-KOYOU SHAKAI NO HŌ [New-Law At Employment Society] 57 (Supp. ed. 
2004). 
118 Rōdō Keiyakuhō [Employment Contract Law], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 11; Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor 
Standards Law], Law No.49 of 1947, art. 90, para. 1. 
119 See Rōdō Keiyakuhō [Employment Contract Law], Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 8. This is so whether 
the changes of working conditions are provided in work rules or in individual employment contract 
between a particular worker and the employer. 
120 Id. art. 9 (providing that except for the case where the conditions provided in article 10 of the 
Employment Contract Law are met, the workers cannot change the work rules against the interest of the 
workers unilaterally) . New Employment Contract Law became effective in March 2008 and the 
provisions regarding the changes of work rules are one of the major contents of this law. Article 9 of this 
law is confirming that employers cannot always change the work rules against the interest of the 
employees without their consent. See Kōsei Rōdōshou Rōdōkijunkyoku Kantokuka [Inspection Division 
of Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare Labour Standards Bureau], Rōdō Keiyakuhō no Gaiyou [The 
Outline of Employment Contract Law], 1351 JURIST 34, 38 (2008). 
121 Rōdō Keiyakuhō [Employment Contract Law], Law No. 128 of 2007 art. 10. 
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First of all, the workers must be informed of the amended work rules which 
reflect the change of working conditions.122 Second and more important condition is that 
the amendment of the work rules must be reasonable considering various factors 
including the necessity of the changes of the working conditions, extent of the 
disinterest workers will suffer and the process of amendment.123 In reality, the work 
rules are framed and revised through negotiations with the Labor Union, since the 
implementation of these rules is impossible without the Labor Union’s support.  
It can be said that Japanese employers are required to protect employment 
more intensely than employers in other developed countries because of both social 
norms and legal doctrines. In exchange, they are given a greater power of discretion to 
                                                  
122 Id. 
123 Id. This is based on the case laws about the changes of work rules. See, e.g., Yoshikawa v. Shūhoku 
Bus K.K., 22 MINSHŪ 3459, 4363-64 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 25, 1968) (indicating that change of the work rule 
must be reasonable and affirmed the change of the defendant corporation in order to introduce mandatory 
retirement age); Satō v. Dai Shi Ginkou K.K., 51 MINSHŪ 705 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 28 1997) (in affirming the 
judgment of Tokyo High Court, the Supreme Court held that the change of work rules which extends the 
mandatory retirement age of defendant bank from 55 to 60 but in turn reduces the wages is valid. In this 
case, before the change of work rules defendant bank had already hired employees over 55 until 58 on the 
work conditions that is substantially same as the work condition just before the mandatory retirement and 
therefore the change of work rules could be considerably disadvantageous to the employees. The court 
affirmed the change on the ground that the necessity of the change was so large, the wage after the change 
is still high compared to other firm and the union of defendant bank had negotiated and agreed on the 
change.) Article 10 codified the summary of these case laws. See Takashi Muranaka, Rōdō Keiyakuhō 
Seitei no Igi to Kadai [The Significance and problems of the Legislation of Employment Contract Law], 
1351 JURIST 42, 43-45 (2008). For the cases of work rule changes involving reduction of wages, see infra 
notes 132 & 133 and accompanying text. 
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set the work rules based on working conditions, personnel affairs, and enterprise order 
and discipline. 
E. Working Conditions 
The LTER is based on OJT and career promotion. In this process, the Japanese 
labor law has given employers the freedom to control personnel matters and enterprise 
order and discipline without much legal intervention. The legal bases are the work rules 
that form the main body of the labor contract in the LTER. 
First, firms have the freedom of recruitment and Japanese employers have 
significantly more discretion in this aspect124 than those in the U.S., wherein legislation 
on discrimination in the labor market is developed and thus discretion in hiring and 
recruitment is constrained.125 
Following recruitment, it is customary for Japanese firms to require active 
human capital investment by workers. This OJT is conducted only on the initiative of 
                                                  
124 See, e.g., Takano v. Mitsubishi Jushi K.K., 27 MINSHŪ 1536, 1543-46 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 12, 1973) (in 
remanding the case to Tokyo High Court, The Supreme Court indicated that in principle article 14 of the 
Constitution, which prohibits discriminatory treatment, does not restrict the discretion of firms in hiring 
and recruitment stage and thus investigating and asking about political ideology of candidate of recruit is 
not deemed illegal.). 
125 See ARAKI, supra note 21, at 60-62. But as mentioned earlier, Equal Employment Opportunity Law 
prohibits discriminatory treatment by gender at the stage of recruitment and hiring (Koyō no Bunya ni 
okeru Danjo no Kintō na Kikai oyobi Taigū no Kakuho ni Kansuru Hōritsu [Equal Employment 
Opportunity Law], Law No. 113 of 1972, art. 5). See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. 
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the firms.126 The demand for OJT is linked with frequent rotations to train in various 
types of jobs. In addition, employers have broad discretion regarding personnel 
reassignments at least for typical workers (whose work place and/or job types are not 
explicitly restricted under employment contracts).127 Sometimes, its violation results in 
punitive dismissal. The law supports the system by admitting the employers’ right to 
order and conduct OJT.128 As explained before, the Japanese wage payment system is 
not strongly associated with the type of job or location of the office.129 Hence, the 
employers’ having substantial discretion with regard to personnel affairs does not 
directly lead to serious damages for employees.130   
F. Wage Payment 
With regard to the other aspects of working conditions, wage payment is 
clearly the most important matter. One legal restriction is the regulation of minimum 
                                                  
126 See SUGENO, supra note 117, at 135. 
127 See, e.g., Moribe v. Kyūshū Asahi Hōsō K.K., 757 RŌHAN 21 (Fukuoka High Ct., July 30, 1996) 
(judging that there was no restriction of job types and therefore the reassignment of was valid), aff’d, 757 
RŌHAN 20 (Sup. Ct., Sep. 10, 1998). 
128 See ARAKI, supra note 21, at 132-36. 
129 See supra section II.A. 
130 In contrast to the recruitment stage, discriminatory treatment using personnel reassignments by 
nationalities, ideologies, sexes or union activities are strictly restricted once hired. See Rōdō Kijunhō 
[Labor Standards Law], Law No.49 of 1947, arts. 3 & 4; Koyō no Bunya ni okeru Danjo no Kintō na 
Kikai oyobi Taigū no Kakuho ni Kansuru Hōritsu [Equal Employment Opportunity Law], Law No. 113 
of 1972, arts. 5-9. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text for further details. 
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wages.131 For the wage payment system in the LTER, again, the autonomy of the 
management and laborers is broad. Naturally the wages under LTER must not be lower 
than the minimum wage, but there are no legal regulations with respect to the types of 
wage payments such as seniority, performance pay, or wages attached to the job.  
Bonus or retirement payments are not even legally required. 
Owing to its importance, there are relatively more legal disputes concerning 
wage payments than other matters. In particular, during the Oil Shock and the 1990s 
recession, a drastic change in wage payment was often required for the survival of firms, 
and this unexpected change was frequently contested.  
With respect to its legal arbitration, the courts flexibly accepted this 
adjustment by considering the “reasonableness” of the revision of work rules on 
payment, adopting a synthetic judgment for each case.132 One basic doctrine is that it is 
                                                  
131 In Japan, there are regional (for each prefecture) minimum wages and industrial minimum wages. 
These are based on investigation by Minimum Wage Council (Saitei Chingin Shinsakai). See Saitei 
Chinginhō [Minimum Wage Law], Law No. 137 of 1959, art. 16. Employers must, in principle, pay at 
least these minimum wages to workers (id. art. 5 para. 1) and Labor Standards Inspector (Rōdō Kijun 
Kantokukan) has the authority to investigate, inspect and question in order to ensure the performance of 
employers’ duties (id. art. 38).  
132 See Yoshikawa v. Shūhoku Bus K.K., 22 MINSHŪ 3459, 4363-64 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 25, 1968); Satō v. 
Dai Shi Ginkou K.K., 51 MINSHŪ 705 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 28 1997); Murose v. Michinoku Ginkou K.K., 54 
MINSHŪ 2075 (Sup. Ct., Sep. 7. 2000) (denying the effect of work rule amendment that resulted in the 
reduction of the wage for workers who are above 55). See also SUGENO, supra note 57, 228-29, 489-91. 
For the law on the change of work rules, see supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text. 
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not impossible for employers to changes the payment system, at least it is judged 
indispensible to protect the employment of workers.133 
 The more significant restriction to support real wages in Japan after the late 
1980s came rather from the regulation of working hours. 134  The Japanese Labor 
Standards Law that adopted the 48 hour workweek system was substantially revised in 
1987 and, with gradual reduction of working hours, by 1997, the principle of the 40 hour 
workweek was put completely into practice.135 When employers require overtime or 
rest-day work, employers must make an agreement with the Labor Union (or the 
representative of majority of the employees in the office) and must file the agreement 
with the Labor Standards Inspection Office.136 In addition, employers must pay a wage 
premium for such work.137  Although it has been said that Japanese workers are 
                                                  
133 See, e.g., Tamura v. TM K.K., 1641 RŌDŌ KEIZAI HANREI SOKUHOU 22 (Osaka D. Ct., May 28, 
1997) (in affirming the reduction of wage as part of reconstruction of defendant corporation, the court 
affirmed that there was no objection by plaintiff and the reduction was not against the public policy. On 
the other hand, the court denied the effectiveness of cut of plaintiff’s wage allegedly was due to the poor 
result of his job.) See also ARAKI, supra note 21, at 52-55. But in contrast to minor changes of work rules, 
it is not so easy to reduce the wage unilaterally. See, e.g., Michinoku Ginkou, 54 MINSHŪ at 2093-94. 
134 See generally SUGENO, supra note 57, at 259-60. 
135 See Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No.49 of 1947, art. 32, para. 1 (providing that “an 
employer shall not have a worker work more than forty hours per week”). See also id. art. 32, para. 2 
(providing that “an employer shall not have a worker work more than eight hours per day for each day of 
the week.”).  
136 Id. art. 36, para. 1. 
137 Id. art. 37, paras. 1 & 3. 
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overworked, working hours have continuously declined since the end of the 1980s 
because of the new legal regulations and the beginning of the recession.138   
G. Labor Union and the Dispute Resolution System 
As the LTER is an incomplete contract, there are always chances of disputes 
concerning the interpretation of the contract to occur. The following are the two types of 
dispute resolution systems: bargaining and negotiation organizations and public 
agencies for the arbitration of the disputes.  
In the former resolution system, the most important player is the labor union. 
The recent density of Japanese labor unions is below 20%.139 This is much lower than the 
post-war rate of 50%140: however, it is higher than that in other developed countries such 
as France or the U.S., wherein the union density is around 10%.141 Japanese labor 
                                                  
138 See KŌSEI RŌDŌSHOU [Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare], HEISEI 19NEN-BAN KŌSEI RŌDŌ 
HAKUSHO SHIRYOUHEN [2007 White Paper on Welfare and Labor: Data Appendix] 118 (2007). In reality, 
it is very difficult to compare the working hours of different countries because of the difference of 
institutions and the nature of statistics. As a reference, White Paper on Welfare and Labor provides the 
data of the yearly working hours of the production workers in manufacturing in various countries in 2004. 
According to this data, workers in Japan and the U.S. work for approximately 1950 hours, those in the 
UK work for about 1900 hours, and those in France and Germany work for about 1530. See id. With 
regard to this data, the working hours of Japanese workers are still much higher than those of the workers 
in European countries: however, it is coming closer to the level of the U.K. and the U.S. See id. 
139 See id. at 140. 
140 See id. 
141 OECD, OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2004, at 145 (2004). 
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unions are enterprise unions.142 Though they often join an industrial federation of 
unions, industry-level collective bargaining is not common.143 In the case of industrial 
union, the negotiation aims at setting the criteria for generally regulating the labor 
conditions in the labor market. In contrast, Japanese labor-management negotiations 
mainly deal with intra-firm disputes.144 In particular, after 1960, when the enterprise 
unions 145  began to establish the cooperative labor-management relationship and 
strengthened their management participation functions, Japanese labor unions grew 
closer in substance to the workers’ council in Europe than to the European labor 
unions.146 
 In the Japanese labor union law, the right of labor unions is strongly protected, 
reflecting the legislative intent immediately after the war to promote the right of 
                                                  
142 See SUGENO, supra note 57, at 500. 
143 See ARAKI, supra note 21, at 164.  
144 Note, however, that by using Shun-to (Spring Wage Offensive), labor unions also coordinate 
enterprise-level negotiations for the yearly increase in wage rates to a reasonable level, while adjusting it 
to the macroeconomic conditions of the year. See, e.g., REBICK, supra note 29, at 77 & 79. 
145 Even in small firms wherein labor unions do not exist, joint labor-management committee often exist: 
these committees perform the same role. See id. at 81-82. 
146 Unlike the European countries, the trial of labor unions to support political parties that have the ability 
to form a cabinet was not successful at present. See ARAKI, supra note 21, at 79. Instead, labor unions 
dispatch representatives to government administrative organizations in order to reflect their views in the 
economic policy of the government. See SUGENO, supra note 117, at 11 & 296-97. 
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laborers.147 It consists of the right to organize, bargain collectively, and take collective 
action.148 These days, explicit collective actions are rare, and collective bargaining is 
replaced with a more informal negotiation known as labor-management consultation.149 
However, these rights of the labor unions definitely hold the effect of a threat point in 
the negotiation and have served to promote the position of laborers. 
 The agreements between workers and employers formed through 
labor-management negotiations are either established as collective agreements (Rōdō 
Kyouyaku), which are superior to work rules,150 or induce changes in the work rules.151 
The system of labor-management consultation not only serves to improve the working 
conditions of laborers but also materializes the participation of labor in management, 
particularly when the managerial environment changes drastically.  
 When disputes cannot be resolved, public agencies engage in arbitration. In the 
case of collective disputes, the Labor Commissions (Rōdō Iinkai) intervene.152 Although 
it is a part of public administration, its members are chosen from outside, such as 
                                                  
147 See Rōdō Kumiaihō [Labor union Law], Law No. 174 of 1949, art. 1 (providing that main aim of the 
Law is “to elevate the status of workers by promoting their equal standing with their employers in 
bargaining.”). 
148 See id. art. 6. 
149 See ARAKI, supra note 21, at 179-80. 
150 See Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No.49 of 1947, art. 92, para. 1. 
151 See SUGENO, supra note 57, at 114-15. 
152 See Rōdō Kumiaihō [Labor union Law], Law No. 174 of 1949, art. 20. 
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academics or lawyers and representatives of unions and employers, 153  and its 
independences from the bureaucracy is guaranteed.154 The basic principle of the Labor 
Relations Commissions is to respect the labor-management autonomy so that usually it 
does not compel the resolution of the disputes.155 Though it orders remedial measures to 
rectify the consequences of unfair labor practices, it has no prosecution division, unlike 
its American counterpart. 156  Owing to the development of the labor-management 
consultation system, the number of cases dealt with by the Commissions is 
diminishing.157 
 Individual disputes may go on to civil litigation. As Japan does not have a 
special Labor Court, the disputes are treated as normal civil cases. The most important 
feature of individual disputes in Japan is the small number of litigations. There are only 
2000-3000 civil cases related to labor disputes that are filed to district courts every 
year.158 This is in sharp contrast with European countries such as France and Germany, 
                                                  
153 Id. art. 19, para. 1. 
154 See ARAKI, supra note 21, at 191-93. 
155 See SUGENO, supra note 57, at 673-74. 
156 See ARAKI, supra note 21, at 193-94. 
157 See KŌSEI RŌDŌSHOU, supra note 138, at 140. 
158 See Saikō Saibansho Jimusōkyoku Gyōseikyoku [Administrative Affairs Bureau, Supreme Court], 
Heisei 19 nendo Rōdō Kankei Minji, Gyōsei Jiken no Gaikyō [Outline of Labor Relations Civil and 
Administrative Cases for 2007], 60 HŌSŌ JIHŌ 2421, 2447 (2008) (2246 cases filed in 2007. From 1998 
to 2007, 1708 to 2519 cases are filed.). 
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wherein 160,000-600,000 cases are treated per year by the Labor Courts.159 
 There are numerous ways to explain why Japan experiences a much lower 
number of litigation than Western countries. The first explanation attributes this to the 
fact that the culture of avoiding disputes is inherent in the Japanese population.160 The 
second explanation is the high litigation cost due to the small number of lawyers and 
judges, while the third is the development of a system to promote out of court 
agreements.161  In the case of labor disputes, labor-management consultations and the 
administrative schemes to promote pre-trial agreement are particularly developed. 
With the addition of high costs of litigation, everything possible is done to prevent 
disputes from going to courts.   
H.Labor Market Policy 
Finally, let us briefly look at the labor market policy in Japan. The Doctrine of 
                                                  
159 Id. at 375. 
160 See, e.g., Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE 
LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 41 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed. 1961). 
161 This problem was studied in J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: 
Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (1989). In the case of a car 
accident compensation that it chiefly studied, it exclusively chose the third explanation, i.e., the broad 
possibility of an out-of-court compromise due to the transparency of judgment of Japanese courts, and 
argued that the Japanese party that was injured in the accident has sufficiently claimed its right to 
compensate for its loss. Id. at 278-81 & 289-90. In the case of labor disputes, however, we believe that 
the protection of the right of workers is not sufficient in the present system. Although the bargaining 
power of labor unions is effective in protecting employment and the average wage level, it is not effective 
enough in preventing the infringement of the individual right of workers.  
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Abusive Dismissal162 is an important element of the employment policy in Japan. The 
other policies dealing with the labor market also emphasize the protection of 
employment as its basic objective. For this purpose, the need for active intervention of 
the government in the labor market is explicitly stated.163 In practice, the policies 
mentioned below are important.164 
 First, private employment agencies had been strictly regulated, considering the 
problem of exploitation by intermediaries, which had often been a serious social 
problem before World War II.165  Instead, Public Employment Security Office, a public 
agency, in principle, had monopolized placement and vocational guidance activities.166 
Second, unemployment benefits are provided to help unemployed workers.167 Third, 
public measures have been taken for the development of the vocational abilities of 
workers.168 Fourth, financial support is also offered to promote the employment of 
elders, 169  and handicapped people, 170  partly for the purpose of providing equal 
                                                  
162 For the doctrine of abusive dismissal, see supra notes 88- 109 and accompanying text. 
163 See Koyō Kankei Chōseihō [Employment Measures Law], Law No. 132 of 1966, arts. 1, 3, & 4. 
164 For the survey of the Japanese law of the labor market, see SUGENO, supra note 57, at 31-73. 
165 See supra note 56.  
166 See Rōdō Kijunhō [Labor Standards Law], Law No.49 of 1947, art. 6.  
167 See generally Koyō Hokenhō [Employment Insurance Law], Law No. 116 of 1974. 
168 See generally SUGENO, supra note 57, at 48-51. 
169 See Koyō Hokenhō Shikoukisoku [Rule for Enforcement of Employment Insurance Law], Ministry of 
Labour Rule No. 3 of 1975, art. 104 (providing subsidies for certain employment of elders). For an 
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opportunities to workers. Fifth, the employment measures are designed to support 
depressed industries and areas.171 
 As the list of policies above shows, the support to the unemployed people and 
the subsidization for the protection of employment form the main body of the policies, 
reflecting its objective of promoting employment security. A conventional wisdom of 
neoclassical economics tells the latter as the type of policy that simply preserve the 
inefficiency of the market, thereby impeding competition.172 After 2000s, when firms 
began active employment adjustment, and the unemployment rate approached the 5% 
level, 173  Japan’s employment policy is shifting its emphasis from protecting the 
                                                                                                                                                  
explanation of Japanese Law concerning employment of elders, see Noboru Yamashita, Act Concerning 
Stabilization of Employment of Older Persons, 4 JAPAN LABOR REV., no.3, at 71 (2007). 
170 In essence, Law for Promotion of Employment of Handicapped People provides that if a firm (only 
those usually employ more than 300 employees) employs handicapped workers less than certain 
percentage (1.8%) of total workers then the firm has to pay penalties. See Shōgaisha no Koyō no 
Sokushintō ni kansuru Hōritsu [Law for Promotion of Employment of Handicapped People], Law No. 
123 of 1960, art. 53; Shōgaisha no Koyō no Sokushintō ni kansuru Hōritsu Shikourei [Ordinance for 
Enforcement of Law for Promotion of Employment of Handicapped People], Ordinance No. 292 of 1960, 
art. 18. In contrast, if a firm employs handicapped workers more than that percentage then it will be 
subsidized. See Shōgaisha no Koyō no Sokushintō ni kansuru Hōritsu [Law for Promotion of 
Employment of Handicapped People], Law No. 123 of 1960, arts. 49 & 50. 
171 For present situation concerning regional employment, see Minoru Ito, Measures for Supporting 
Regional Job Creation in Japan, 5 JAPAN LABOR REV., no.1, at 85, 92-99 (2008). 
172 See, e.g., HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 303-10 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that subsidies and 
differential tax treatment among production factors create deadweight losses to the overall economy). 
173 See MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOUR AND WELFARE, WHITE PAPER ON THE LABOUR ECONOMY 2005, at 
3-4 (2005), available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/wp/l-economy/2005/dl/01-01.pdf.  
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pre-existing employment to absorb the existing unemployment.174 The drastic reform of 
the labor market law is now in progress, as will be shown in section IV. B. 
 
IV. Economic Consequences of the Japanese Legal Policy on Labor Relations 
A. The Relationship between Labor Relations and the Labor Law in Japan 
 The JEC and Japanese labor law developed in parallel after World War II. Is it 
then possible to state that the Japanese labor law enforced the establishment of JEC? 
As the basic principles of the Japanese labor law suggest, the legal system and its 
principles were influenced by Western society, particularly the U.S., after World War 
II.175  Therefore, it is difficult to say that those laws enacted through the reform after 
the World War II themselves established the development of the JEC, which 
characterized the post-war Japanese employment system.   
Furthermore, the Japanese labor law at least in part respects the autonomy of 
labor and management by establishing only the basic framework concerning industrial 
relations. There are not many laws that enforce or even point toward the JEC, and 
hence, it can be said that the labor laws only set the frame and the base of the 
autonomous negotiation under which the LTER had been developed spontaneously. In 
                                                  
174 See ARAKI, supra note 21, at 31-32. 
175 See GOULD, supra note 30, at ch. 2 &106-16. 
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other words, labor laws restricted freedom of contracting in some part by setting the 
minimum standards or by regulating the way of negotiation but the LTER is something 
that emerged within that restriction as a set of contracts (in the economical sense). This 
observation corresponds with our theoretical conclusion concerning the JEC in section 
II.B. that the LTER in Japan can be regarded as an implicit contract, which continues 
for a long period and which is self-binding between employers and employees. Let us 
review the details. 
First, with respect to individual labor relations, the JEC possesses unique 
features in its promotion and payment systems such as broad discretionary power of 
management on the working conditions and personnel administration or flexible and 
reliable wage payment. As explained in section II.B, this is the feature of the Japanese 
LTER that has led to an increase in the productivity of workers and has provided 
incentives for them. Therefore, it is regarded as the most important part of the LTER by 
which Japanese firms keep their economy strong. 
However, these features are not specified within the verifiable contract 
between worker and employer when the worker is hired. They are guaranteed by the 
work rule that is set autonomously through the agreement between employers and 
workers, and the legal intervention in this autonomy is not so affirmative but is 
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restrained.  
       One important exception is the area of employment protection, wherein the 
explicit regulation by The Doctrine of Abusive Dismissal was effective. Even in the case 
of adjustment dismissal, it is not clear whether the doctrine indeed directly reinforced 
the employment protection. As we explained in section III.C., this doctrine began with 
the adjustment of the judicial decision to the social norm of the LTER: it was rather long 
after the establishment of the custom of the LTER that this doctrine had its explicit 
regulatory effect due to the accumulation of precedents. In other words, the LTER was 
originally established as a social norm in Japanese employment society and the doctrine 
led the real economy only partially toward the protection of the LTER by legal 
enforcement. 
The same is the case with regard to the Japanese labor union law. The 
long-term cooperative relationship between the Labor Union and management is a key 
aspect of the superiority of the LTER in Japan,176 as was discussed in Part II.177 For 
example, in the several recessions that Japan experienced since the Oil Shock, this 
consultation system has contributed to the improvement of the organization of firms 
                                                  
176 See KOIKE, supra note 6, at 207-16; Kanemoto & MacLeod, supra note 42, at 145-46. 
177 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. 
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and industries while protecting employment.178 Even during the long-run stagnation 
after the 1990s, this consultation system essentially succeeded in maintaining a 
cooperative relationship between labor and management while drastically restructuring 
firms.179  
Further, having been introduced immediately after the war with the U.S., it is 
noteworthy that the Japanese labor union law never forced, or even expected this form 
of labor union. The social and economic circumstances experienced by Japan after the 
war created the enterprise labor union,180 as in the case of other JEC. It is possible to 
develop this custom only by strictly respecting the fundamental rule of 
“labor-management autonomy”.181  
In summary, the Japanese legal system has made important contributions as a 
sub-system to the social enforcement of the JEC merely through setting a reasonable 
stage for the mutual agreement between labor and management. With the protection of 
the right of workers and the autonomy of parties guaranteed by the legal framework, 
labor and management autonomously adopted the system of JEC as a type of implicit 
                                                  
178 See SUGENO, supra note 117, at 12 & 304-07. 
179 See ARAKI, supra note 21, at 166. Even today, the Japanese unemployment rate is approximately 5%. 
See KŌSEI RŌDŌSHOU, supra note 138, at 15.  
180 See ARAKI, supra note 21, at 165-66. 
181 Id. at 165-166. 
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contract in post-war Japan. 
It may be noteworthy to mention a covert but important legal aspect for the 
establishment of the JEC. The Japanese legal system for minimizing individual labor 
disputes has greatly contributed to the efficient management by decreasing dispute 
costs to firms and protecting their power of discretion. At the same time, however, it 
seems that the high cost of litigation and the social pressure for pretrial agreements 
have made it difficult to bring lawsuit.182 It has been argued that a new system of 
individual dispute resolution, which is more accessible to individual workers, should be 
organized.183 
B. Adjustment of Labor Relations and Labor Law to the Structural Change of the 
Economy after the 1990s 
Following the 1990s, the merit of the JEC diminished because of the active 
technological innovations. Firms are required to shed unwanted labor to cope with the 
long-run macroeconomic stagnation. Therefore, it was necessary to restructure the 
                                                  
182 See Kazuo Sugeno, Judicial Reform and the Reform of the Labor Dispute Resolution System, 3 JAPAN 
LABOR REV., no.1, at 4, 5-6 (2006) (indicating the backgrounds of small numbers of labor litigations in 
Japan). 
183 See, e.g., id. at 8-12 (discussing the need for reform of individual labor disputes resolution system). 
For labor tribunal system under Labor Tribunal Law (Rōdō Shinpanhō) of 2004, see Katsutoshi Kezuka, 
Significance and Tasks involved in Establishment of a Labor Tribunal System, 3 JAPAN LABOR REV., no.1, 
at 13, 16-27 (2006). 
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existing industries, and develop new industries that embodied new technologies by 
using the market mechanism, including the migration of labor force from old to new 
businesses and industries. As we will see below, while in some areas of the labor law, 
this reform was actually put into effect, the regulation of labor relations and labor 
market has been tightened in other areas leading to the aggravation of distortionary 
effects on the economy. This section discusses first the competition-promoting change 
and the next section discusses the efficiency-decreasing regulations.  
The reform of the JEC by law was first put into practice by using its flexible 
legal structure. As pointed out in the previous section, the Japanese labor law does not 
reinforce or even push in the direction of an LTER as the typical employment relation in 
Japan. It allows for various types of labor contracts. In effect, the present labor 
contracts in Japan allow more specific and individualized contracts other than the 
LTER. The Japanese wage payment system based on seniority is also being reformed to 
reflect performance measures more directly.184 As the awareness of laborers changes, 
they are willing to accept these changes.185 This change allows for richer options for 
workers and will be efficiency enhancing in the present economic environment, where 
                                                  
184 See KŌSEI RŌDŌSHOU [Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare], HEISEI 19NEN-BAN RŌDŌ KEIZAI NO 
BUNSEKI [Analysis of Labor Economics 2007] 105-08 (2007) (indicating that making wage more reactive 
to workers’ performance has become popular). 
185 See ARAKI, supra note 21, at 70-73. 
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technical progress, and the diversification of labor force such as female-labor, 
middle-aged and older workers, and foreigners deepen rapidly. The general theory of 
labor contract within the Japanese labor law is sufficiently broad to cope with this 
possible change. 
      In the area of labor market law, more explicit reforms are currently in progress.  
To cope with the rapid change in the economic environment, the Japanese labor law has 
recently begun to emphasize the activation of the external labor market by the 
deregulation of the private employment agency business186 and public support to the 
vocational training provided to the unemployed.187 The law for subsidizing employment 
in depressed industries has been abolished188 and instead a subsidization policy related 
to newly created industries such as those pertaining to information, environment, 
medicine, and welfare industries was implemented.189 At the same time, unemployment 
                                                  
186 For the deregulations concerning workers dispatch, see supra note 82 and accompanying text.  
187 See KŌSEI RŌDŌSHOU, supra note 138, at 223-28 (explaining measures for vocational training). 
188 Tokutei Fukyou Gyoushutō Kankei Rōdōsha no Koyou no Antei ni kansuru Tokubetsu Sochihō [Law 
on Special Measures Concerning the Stabilization of Employment in Specified Depressed Industries], 
Law No. 39 of 1983 was abolished in 2001. This abolition was a part of reform of labor market law in 
2001 which in turn was in line with the deregulation policy of Japan after bubble economy. 
189 Koyō Taisakuhō [Employment Measure Law], Law No. 132 of 1966 was amended. This amendment 
was also a part of the reform in 2001. See KAZUO SUGENO, SHIN-KOYŌ SHAKAI NO HŌ [Employment 
System and Labor Law] 88-93 (Supplemented ed. 2004). In this reform, law regarding regional 
employment was also amended. See Ito, supra note 171, at 88-91 (explaining policy and legal changes 
concerning regional employment after 2000). 
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benefits are enhanced in order to provide a safety net to cope with increasing 
unemployment.   
         It can be said that the present employment policy in Japan not only uses the 
JEC to protect employment but also supports the adjustment ability of the external 
labor market mechanism and tries to integrate these two previously distinct policies to 
establish full employment. 
C. Potential Sources of Economic Distortion by Legal Regulations on Japanese Labor 
Relations 
In some other areas, the direction of the present Japanese labor law 
emphasizes the direct regulation of the labor relations rather than respecting the 
autonomy. This seems in contrast to the required deregulation to recover the efficiency 
of the economy and has resulted in considerable welfare cost since the 1990s.  
First, the regulations of wages are likely to reduce the efficiency of the 
economy. One such direct legal restriction is the minimum wages legislation,190 wherein 
a considerable amount of resource allocation waste has been created for allocating labor 
for small business and part-time workers.191 With respect to workers covered in the 
                                                  
190 For law regarding minimum wages, see supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
191 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 322-55 (7th ed. 2007) (discussing the welfare 
implications of the legal regulation on minimum wages). 
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LTER, a more significant regulation of real wages was the result of the reduction in 
working hours. According to a recent influential empirical research, some significant 
part of the slowdown of the Japanese economy in 1990s can be explained by this 
regulation.192 
 The equal opportunity regulation for male and female workers and a similar 
regulation for protecting foreign workers will be further tightened in the near future.  
In its procedural aspect, the recent development of the judicial reform in Japan intends 
to expand the capacity of the judiciary, including an increase in the number of lawyers 
and more accessibility to the use of litigation.193 With this reform, more labor-related 
disputes will be contested and the right-consciousness of individual employees will be 
enhanced in the near future. One of the aims of this reform is to establish individual 
rights and the rule of law more firmly in Japanese employment society. It should be 
admitted, however, that economic efficiency would be sacrificed by decreasing the 
discretionary power of employers for disciplining workers.  
                                                  
192 See Fumio Hayashi & Edward C. Prescott, The 1990s in Japan: A Lost Decade, 5 REV. ECON. 
DYNAMICS 206 (2002) (suggesting that the strengthened legal restrictions on working hours significantly 
contributed to the slowdown of the macroeconomic performance of the Japanese economy in the 1990s). 
193 See Shihō Seido Kaikaku Shingikai [The Justice System Reform Council], SHIHŌ SEIDO KAIKAKU 
SHINGIKAI IKENSHO: 21 SEIKI NO NIHON WO SASAERU SHIHŌ SEIDO [Recommendations of the Justice 
System Reform Council : For a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century] (June 12, 2001) (the 
basic summary of the idea of the judicial reform in Japan). The English version of this recommendations 
are available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/singikai/990612_e.html. 
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Let us consider the economic effect of the Japanese employment security 
more in depth. We consider, first, the effect on the allocation of labor among various 
firms and industries, and second, the effect on the accumulation of firm-specific human 
capital. If we consider the frictionless neoclassical competitive labor market, the effect 
on the allocation of labor is neutral to resource allocation including the unemployment 
rate, since the strict protection of workers is completely offset by the reduction of wage 
rates.194 However, it is sometimes difficult to make such adjustment smoothly. For 
example, when firms are required rapid restructuring because of the unexpected change 
of the economic environment, firms are usually constrained by labor law not to make 
drastic reduction of wages. In such cases, firms are required to hire unwanted high-cost 
labor so that the allocation of labor should be distorted by the employment protection. 
Next, if we consider the effect on the firm-specific human capital, there is a 
widespread belief that employment protection enhances the incentive of workers to 
make such investment.195 In reality, this argument does not hold true, since the workers 
protected by the employment protection law have no incentive to make such an effort, 
                                                  
194 See Edward P. Lazear, Employment -at-will, Job Security, and Work Incentives, in EMPLOYMENT, 
UNEMPLOYMENT AND LABOR UTILIZATION 39, 46-52 (Robert A. Hart ed., 1988). 
195 See, e.g., Hiroyuki Chūma, “Kaikoken Ranyou Hōri” no Keizai Bunseki [Economic Analysis of 
“Doctrine of Abusive Dismissal”], in KAISYAHŌ NO KEIZAIGAKU [The Economics of Corporate Law] 425, 
444-50 (Yoshiro Miwa et al. eds., 1998). 
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since their job is legally protected without any effort.196 So, a punishment was rather 
necessary for the workers who did not accumulate firm-specific human capital.   
 In the absence of a method other than dismissal for this punishment, it is true 
that employment protection destroys that innate efficiency in the JEC discussed in 
section II.B., wherein the long-term relationship between the enterprise and union 
makes possible the efficient accumulation of firm-specific human capital as a reputation 
equilibrium. However, it is possible to punish the workers by a reduction in wages or a 
step-down of offices and positions or by suspending the expected promotion of the 
employee. In this case, the employment protection policy is again neutral to resource 
allocation. As we discussed above, the regulations on working conditions, such as 
regulations against discriminations and work time regulation are being strengthened 
after the 1980s. In view of these extended limitations on the discipline of workers, tight 
employment protection is more likely to be a factor in diminishing the efficiency of the 
Japanese labor relations in the accumulation of firm-specific human skills. 
All in all, the overall development of regulations on working conditions and 
employment seems to have made it more difficult for firms to restructure, and for labor 
market to allocate labor force among various industrial sectors more appropriately, 
                                                  
196 See Lazear, supra note 194, at 54-56. 
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impeded the accumulation of skills of workers, and barred new industries from entering 
the market due to the increase in labor cost. As its consequence, more unemployment 
and the substitution of regular workers with part-time workers occurred, particularly in 
the younger generation. 
Main empirical researches on the effect of employment protection on the labor 
market performance confirmed the above conjecture: i.e. that employment protection 
causes a negative effect on the labor market.197 Given these empirical contributions, it 
seems to us that the strengthening of the employment security that developed after the 
1970s in Japan caused welfare loss to the Japanese economy. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This article discussed the functions of the Japanese labor law in relation to 
the Japanese system of labor relations, which we refer to as the JEC. We first selected 
the characteristics of the JEC as compared with Western countries. In the LTER that 
prevails in Japan, workers must follow orders from the employer with respect to OJT 
                                                  
197 See, e.g., Edward P. Lazear, Job Security Provisions and Employment, 105 Q.J. ECON. 699, 706-17 
(1990) (empirically showing that the employment protection policy not only increases unemployment but 
also creates the tendency to replace the permanent positions of workers with part-time workers.); James 
Heckman & Carmen Pages-Serra, The Cost of Job Security Regulation: Evidence from Latin American 
Labor Markets, 1 ECONOMIA 109 (2000) (empirically showing that employment regulation decreases the 
employment rate, especially for the younger generation). 
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and other personnel affairs, enterprise order and discipline. They also accept subjective 
merit ratings by the employers. Employers are, in turn, committed to the permanent 
employment of workers and appropriate payment of wages for their efforts, without 
depending on the managerial environment. This efficient outcome is characterized by a 
high level of accumulation of firm-specific intellectual skills to attain high productivity 
and low unemployment. 
 Since this system is in principle realized as a self-enforcing social equilibrium, 
it is not enforced directly through the Japanese labor law. However, in several aspects, 
the Japanese labor law has served as a subsystem to support this efficient social 
equilibrium. First, Japanese employers are, by law, allowed more discretionary freedom 
for controlling laborers than the employers in the West. This facilitated the capability of 
employers to reassign workers and increase investment in firm-specific skills through 
OJT. The limited access of workers to litigation also served to protect this system. 
Second, the rights of the workers are strongly protected to guarantee a favorable 
position in the collective bargaining with management and this made it possible to 
guarantee an appropriate reward to the employees who made sufficient effort in the 
accumulation of firm-specific human capital. Third, labor-management autonomy 
remains broad with regard to dispute resolution, so that legal regulation and 
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arbitration are not actively pursued. This principle made it possible to realize the 
efficient reputation equilibrium through the long-term relationship between unions and 
employers.  
 At present, it is unclear whether the JEC will prevail in the future. If it is not 
the case, one possibility is that Japanese firms may not protect this custom by reneging 
on the payment of the workers’ effort, pursuing short-run profit. Then, the JEC will be 
transformed into a neo-classical competitive market system. Although we regard it as 
less efficient than the JEC in its successful state, it might be the case that the labor 
market allocation of human resource may be even superior to that by an internal labor 
market in the present economy, wherein technical innovation is active and the 
diversification of labor force is developing, since firm-specific human capital is relatively 
less important in this type of economic situation. If this is the case, this transition is 
favorable for the efficiency of the overall economy. In this case, however, appropriate 
legal measures should be considered as a safety net for workers who belonged to the 
LTER but were reneged on the payment for their efforts. 
    Another possibility is that Japanese workers may demand more comfortable 
working conditions, while protecting the legal regulations on employment security. In 
this case, Japanese employment society will converge to an economy with lower 
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productivity and a higher unemployment rate, as observed in European countries. 
 In any case, as long as the JEC is the product of the labor-management 
autonomy, which was not directly enforced through law, it is unlikely for the law to have 
a decisive power for its protection in the future. However, it is important that the law 
should not have a negative efficiency effect through inappropriate legal intervention in 
labor relations. 
  For example, it does not seem necessary to regulate working hours to 
harmonize with “World Standards” through legal enforcement. For the sake of efficiency, 
it is much more reasonable to leave the matter to the individual agreement between 
workers and employers. At the same time, employment security measures should not be 
chosen to preserve the unproductive sector of the economy, impede the development of 
new and productive industries, and to rescue unwanted or unmotivated workers. Given 
the need to extend the regulation on the working conditions, particularly with respect to 
equal opportunity policies for sexes, ages, nationalities, and rapid technical innovation, 
the relaxation of the protection of employees is necessary for the discipline of laborers 
and spectral adjustment in Japanese employment society in the near future.  
 
 
